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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of two 
environmental instruments -- emission tax 
and emission standard -- to the firm's 
equilibrium behaviors in a polluting oligopoly.  
Different from others, the abatement 
investment is also a choice variable of the 
firms in additional to output.  The findings 
show that pollution emission may increase 
when the government sets a higher tax rate.  
Even though a stricter environmental policy is 
employed, a firm's optimal profit is not 
necessarily lowered.  That is, a firm may 
benefit from a stricter environmental policy, 
while the society may suffer.  However, we 
do find the optimal social welfare could be 
achieved when the industry is relatively low 
polluting, only by the use of a subsidy.  
Through this, the firms under each instrument 
in the second period have the same best 
reactions, which in turn cause to a same effect 
on achieving the optimal social welfare.  But, 
without the subsidy scheme, an emission 
standard turns out to be superior; the first-best 
outcome cannot be achieved; and each firm 
tends to overproduce.  
 
Keywords: emission standard, emission tax, 
Cournot competition 
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Unlike the market structures of perfect 
competition and monopoly, an oligopoly is 
complicated due to its interdependent 
behaviors among firms, which distort 
production, and therefore pollution and the 
social welfare.  This certainly affects the 
government choice of an optimal 
environmental policy. 
To remedy this sort of distortion, 
environmental instruments are adopted.  
Their purpose is to reduce pollution down to 
a desired level by creating incentives to firms.  
Two types of incentives can be identified.  
One is to induce firms to invest in abatement 
technology upgrading, while the other is to 
reduce their outputs.  The direct effect 
increases a firm's cost, while the indirect 
effect decreases a firm's output, which causes 
a contraction of market output and a markup 
of market price.  Therefore, there must exist 
some sort of tradeoff. 
The government, in face of the market 
structure, needs to choose an instrument and 
its regulating level so as to achieve the 
highest social welfare, which as has been 
noted, is influenced by the market output, 
each firm's abatement cost, as well as the 
pollution damage.  This paper, confined to 
the oligopoly, models the interactions 
between the firms and the government to 
demonstrate the policy effect on social 
welfare. 
In this paper two common types of 
environmental instruments will be discussed.  
One is an emission tax, where emissions are 
taxed at a rate t; see e.g. Levin (1985), Kim 
and Chang (1993), Requate (1993), 
Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995), and 
Damania (1996), and Hoel (1998).  The 
other is an emission standard, where the 
government announces an upper limit e0 on 
emissions; see e.g. Harford (1975), Dewees 
(1983), Watson and Ridker (1984), and 
Bohm and Russell (1985).  
This paper differs from the existing 
literature in several features.  First, it sets up 
a two-period model.  The government in the 
first period chooses one of the two 
environmental instruments, an emission tax 
or an emission standard, and sets its 
regulating level.  Each firm, which 
competes in an oligopoly, then chooses 
output and abatement investment.  Second, 
it centers on the effect comparison of a firm's 
behavior between the two instruments.  
Third, the first-best welfare is compared.  
Therefore, not only are the firms' equil ibrium 
behaviors explored, but the government's 
optimal policies are also discussed. 
A two-period model is employed.  In 
the first period, the government sets an 
environmental policy, then in the second 
period each firm under an n-firm 
homogeneous-product oligopoly chooses an 
output qi and an abatement investment ai  
simultaneously.  Through these settings, we 
analyze the impact of the government 
environmental policies -- emission tax and 
emission standard. 
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 The findings of this paper are as 
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follows: 
 
Proposition 1.  In a polluting oligopoly, a 
higher tax rate may lead to increased 
pollution.  Increased profit may also result 
when the government imposes a stricter 
policy. 
 
Resembling Levin (1985), it says that 
pollution may increase when a tax policy 
gets stricter.  In contrast to Katz and Rosen 
(1983), it states that a stricter policy -- a tax 
or a standard -- will cause an ambiguous 
change in optimal profit. 
 
Lemma 1.  When the marginal social 
damage is small enough, a negative tax rate 
becomes necessary to achieve the optimal 
social welfare. 
 
Lemma 2.  With a target level of emission, 
a firm's best-reaction strategies in the second 
period under both instruments -- emission tax 
and emission standard -- are identical. 
 
Even though a different instrument is 
employed, a firm has the same best reactions 
in the second period.  Therefore, on 
achieving the optimal social welfare, an 
emission tax and an emission standard turn 
out to have the same effect. 
 
Lemma 3.  The emission standard 
instrument can lead to any result of an 
emission tax instrument. 
 
That is, an emission standard becomes 
superior when a negative tax is not allowed. 
 
Proposition 2.  In a polluting oligopoly, if a 
subsidy is possible, then the environmental 
instrument of an optimal emission tax and an 
optimal emission standard are equivalent.  
Otherwise, an optimal tax is no better than an 
optimal standard. 
 
Due to the double distortions -- 
pollution and strategic behavior -- in an 
oligopoly, the first-best outcome cannot be 
achieved by either of the optimal instruments.  
Internalization of marginal damage to a firm 
by a tax, shown in many of the literature, is 
no longer an effective tool. 
 
Proposition 3.  In a polluting oligopoly, the 
first-best outcome cannot be achieved by the 
use of either instrument. 
 
 Therefore, on optimality with either 
instrument, a firm overproduces. 
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This paper differs from the existing 
literature in several features.  First, it sets up 
a two-period model.  The government in the 
first period chooses one of the two 
environmental instruments, an emission tax 
or an emission standard, and sets its 
regulating level.  Each firm, which 
competes in an oligopoly, then chooses 
output and abatement level.   Second, it 
centers on the effect comparison of a firm's 
behavior between the two instruments.  
Third, the first-best welfare is compared.  
Therefore, not only are the firms' equil ibrium 
behaviors explored, but the government's 
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optimal policies are also discussed.    
Surprisingly, we find the two 
instruments in general turn out to be 
equivalent except for an industry with a very 
low pollution damage, in which an optimal 
emission standard turns out to be a better one 
if a subsidy scheme is assumed away.  The 
firms tend to overproduce in a dirty 
oligopoly industry even though an 
environmental instrument is employed. 
With different settings from the existing 
literature, we also reprove some traditional 
wisdom. 
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